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LANGUAGE AND CURIOSITY IN HOBBES’ 
PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY
Oberto Marrama 
Introduction: Humanity and the faculty of language
If we look at Hobbes’ philosophical system, we cannot fail to notice the fun-
damental role that language plays at all levels of his discourse.1 Language is a 
key element in Hobbes’ political theory and in his ethics; in Hobbes’ philoso-
phy of science as well as in his theory of mind. Language is so important 
because it is the distinctive feature of human beings, according to Hobbes, 
and Hobbes’ philosophy is in fact centred on man. Its main concerns are with 
how men should live, and in which kind of society; about what men are 
capable of knowing of nature, and by which means; as to how all men can 
have a grasp of their own “train of thoughts,” so to be aware of and regulate 
their passions according to the dictate of their reason. Now, man is what he 
is, Hobbes says, because man is the only animal – or “sensible creature,” as 
Hobbes puts it – who is capable of speaking. That is, only humans are capable 
of recalling, comparing and computing objects of knowledge through words, 
and through words they are also able to communicate their thoughts and 
knowledge to their human counterparts.2
1. The abbreviation EW, followed by the volume number and the page number, refers to 
William B. Molesworth (ed.), The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, 11 vols, 
London, John Bohn / Longman, Brown, Green and Longmans, 1839-1845. 
This work was supported by scholarships from the Programme de soutien aux étudiants de cycles 
supérieurs and from the Laboratoire sur l’histoire et la pensée moderne of the Université du 
Québec à Trois-Rivières. I am grateful to Syliane Malinowski-Charles, Samuel Lizotte, Jean-
François Houle and Torin Doppelt for their helpful comments on a first version of this paper.
2. See Leviathan, I, 4 / EW III, p. 18: “The most noble and profitable invention of all other, 
was that of speech, consisting of names or appellations, and their connexion; whereby men 
register their thoughts; recall them when they are past; and also declare them one to another 
for mutual utility and conversation; without which, there had been amongst men, neither com-
monwealth, nor society, nor contract, nor peace, no more than amongst lions, bears, and wolves.” 
See also Yves C. Zarka, “Aspects sémantiques, syntaxiques et pragmatiques de la théorie du 
langage chez Hobbes,” in Martin Bertman and Michel Malherbe (eds.), Thomas Hobbes, De 
la métaphysique à la politique (Actes du Colloque franco-américain de Nantes), Paris, Vrin, 1989, 
pp. 33-46.
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Without language, therefore, there would be neither laws, nor any form of 
social contract between men. In a nutshell, there would be no human society 
as we know it. For, as Hobbes says, “Men indeed publish their laws by word 
or voice; neither can they make their will universally known any other way.”3 
Furthermore, there would be no science, or philosophy, if by “science” and 
“philosophy” we understand a kind of universal knowledge, which proceeds 
from causes to their effects, and from effects to their causes. “Philosophy,” 
Hobbes says, “is such knowledge of effects or appearances, as we acquire by 
true ratiocination from the knowledge we have first of their causes or genera-
tion: And again, of such causes or generations as may be from knowing first 
their effects.”4 According to Hobbes, this capability of ratiocination is peculiar 
to all men: “Every man,” Hobbes says, “brought Philosophy, that is, Natural 
Reason, into the world with him; for all men can reason to some degree, and 
concerning some things.”5 More importantly, this capability of reasoning is 
peculiar only to human beings. Because only human beings can reassemble 
their thoughts through words and form syllogisms – which thing would be 
otherwise impossible without the aid of language. “It is manifest,” Hobbes 
says, “that living creatures that have not the use of speech, have no concep-
tion or thought in the mind, answering to a syllogism made of universal 
propositions.”6
Thus, to conclude, we can say that without the use of language, according 
to Hobbes, human beings would be and would behave just like beasts: they 
would not be able to gather together and to organise themselves into a society, 
and no man could attain any advance in knowledge, socially or individually. 
However, human beings are not beasts. To the contrary, Hobbes explicitly says 
that humans cannot share anything with beasts and beastly life. And this 
impossibility of any kind of social agreement between humans and beasts is 
precisely due to the use of language, which distinguishes men from beasts, 
and by means of which humanity has definitively emancipated itself from the 
animal condition: “We cannot compact with beasts,” Hobbes says, “neither 
can we give or take from them any manner of right, by reason of their want 
of speech and understanding.”7 In short, all the beauty, on the one hand, as 
3. De Cive, III, 15 / EW II, p. 205.
4. De Corpore,, I, 1, 2 /EW I, p. 3. See also Leviathan, IV, 46 / EW III, p. 664: “By philoso-
phy is understood the knowledge acquired by reasoning, from the manner of the generation of 
any thing, to the properties: or from the properties, to some possible way of generation of the same; 
to the end to be able to produce, as far as matter, and human force permit, such effects, as human 
life requireth.”
5. De Corpore, I, 1, 1 / EW I, p. 1.
6. De Corpore, I, 4, 8 / EW I, p. 50. See also Leviathan, IV, 46 / EW III, p. 665: “The faculty 
of reasoning being consequent to the use of speech, it was not possible, but that there should 
have been some general truths found out by reasoning, as ancient almost as language itself.”
7. De Cive, I, 2 / EW II, p. 22. See also Leviathan, I, 14 / EW III, p. 125: “To make covenants 
with brute beasts, is impossible; because not understanding our speech, they understand not, 
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well as all the problems related to the specifically human life, on the other 
hand—all the achievements of men, as well as all of their mistakes, failures, 
and deceptions—, all of these things peculiar to human life only, find their 
origin in this unique feature of human beings: that men can speak. As Hobbes 
puts it:
It is evident, that truth and falsity have no place but amongst such living creatures 
as use speech. […] Wherefore, as men owe all their true ratiocination to the right 
understanding of speech; so also they owe their errors to the misunderstanding 
of the same; and as all the ornaments of philosophy proceed only from man, so 
from man also is derived the ugly absurdity of false opinions.8
Language, reason and desire: The physiological principle  
of the humans’ actions
Now, language makes reasoning possible, and language and reasoning alto-
gether make human beings essentially different from all other sensible crea-
tures, which are nonetheless equally capable of perceiving the world and 
acting accordingly. What, then, is the benefit provided to men by their faculty 
of reasoning?
According to Hobbes, “Every man, by reasoning, seeks out the means to 
the end which he propounds to himself.”9 Reason, therefore, considered in 
itself, does not substitute, nor is it opposed to the fundamental drive of all of 
men’s deliberations and actions, namely their appetite or desire – that is, their 
natural inclination towards what pleases them and their natural aversion 
towards what causes them harm. “From their first birth,” as Hobbes says, “as 
they are merely sensible creatures, they [i.e., men] have this disposition, that 
immediately as much as in them lies they desire and do whatsoever is best 
pleasing to them, and that either through fear they fly from, or through hard-
ness repel those dangers which approach them.”10
This peculiar agreement between the dictates of reason and the final goals 
of men’s passions and desires, which we can find in Hobbes’ philosophy, rests 
entirely on physiological bases, and it has been well noted by Gianni Paganini, 
in a few illuminating lines: “Of all the principles ‘moving’ the will,” Paganini 
writes, “Hobbes recognizes in the end a single true one: the transmission of 
movement from outside, by a sensible object, and the reaction in terms of 
conatus, that is an infinitely small movement, by the inner parts of the sentient 
being. […] For Hobbes, all actions, whether spontaneous or voluntary, ‘follow 
nor accept of any translation of right; nor can translate any right to another: and without mutual 
acceptation, there is no covenant.”
8. De Corpore, I, 3, 8 / EW I, p. 36.
9. De Cive, II, 14 / EW II, p. 195.
10. De Cive, Preface / EW II, p. xvi.
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immediately the last appetite’11 and are the result of basically the same psy-
chological process. […] The last act of deliberation, that is, the last appetite or 
aversion, is the will.”12
However, it is to be noted that the physiological principle which guides 
humans’ will and actions, and with which human reason complies – that is, 
their desire or appetite, which is necessarily determined by their “conatus,” or 
“endeavour,” as Hobbes also calls it – is the same physiological principle which 
also determines the behaviour of all the other creatures capable of perception 
and spontaneous movement – that is, of both men and animals. That is, the 
will and the actions of any sentient being are necessarily determined by their 
desire – viz. by their appetite towards what pleases them and by their fear 
towards what causes them harm –, which appetite or desire is in turn caused 
by a physiological reaction in terms of “conatus.” I quote from Hobbes:
A child may be so young, as that the appetite thereof is its first appetite, but 
afterwards and often before it come to have the use of reason, may elect one thing 
and refuse another, and consider the consequences of what it is about to do. And 
why not as well as beasts, which never have the use of reason; for they deliberate, 
as men do? For though men and beasts do differ in many things very much, yet 
they differ not in the nature of their deliberation. A man can reckon by words of 
general signification, make propositions, and syllogisms, and compute in num-
bers, magnitudes, proportions, and other things computable; which being done 
by the advantage of language, and words of general significations, a beast that 
hath not language cannot do, nor a man that hath language, if he misplace the 
words, that are his counters.13
From the quoted passage we can see how humans and beasts, in Hobbes’ 
account, are not distinguished because of their common capability of delib-
erating according to their sensations, or because of the presence in them of a 
kind of free will.14 To the contrary, the difference between men and the rest 
of the sentient beings is that men can use the instruments provided by lan-
guage and, as a consequence thereof, by their faculty of reason, in order to 
elaborate their deliberations upon things. That is to say, for example, that men 
can formulate their deliberations in terms of “general signification” – or, other-
11. See EW V, p. 345 (Questions Concerning Liberty, Necessity, and Chance): “Those actions 
that follow immediately the last appetite, are voluntary. And here, where there is one only 
appetite, that one is the last.”
12. Gianni Paganini, “‘Passionate Thought’: reason and the passion of curiosity in Thomas 
Hobbes,” in Sabrina Ebbersmeyer (ed.), Emotional Minds: The Passions and the Limits of Pure 
Inquiry in Early Modern Philosophy, Berlin, De Gruyter, 2012, pp. 236-237.
13. EW V, pp. 94-95.
14. See also Leviathan, I, 6 / EW III, p. 48: “This alternate succession of appetites, aversions, 
hopes and fears, is no less in other living creatures than in man: and therefore beasts also delib-
erate. […] In deliberation, the last appetite, or aversion, immediately adhering to the action, or 
to the omission thereof, is that we call the will; the act, not the faculty, of willing. And beasts 
that have deliberation, must necessarily also have will.”
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wise stated, that they can formulate general precepts and tenets, which are 
universally true and valid independently from the present circumstances 
affecting their senses.
The same physiological principle which is at the core of all animals’ will 
and behaviour, is also the principle according to which all the images and 
thoughts of the things are produced in their brain by their organs of sense. So 
that there is a continuity between the sensible experience of the world, the 
deliberation upon the things thus known, and the following actions, which 
proceed from that deliberation or appetite. This continuity between under-
standing, willing and acting, is granted by the animals’ “conatus,” or “endeav-
our.” According to Hobbes, in fact, all the perceptions and thoughts that a 
sentient creature may have of external things derive their existence from the 
physiological reaction – in terms of “conatus” or “endeavour” – that arises 
within the body after the pressure of an external body upon the organs of 
sense.15 To quote Hobbes: 
Setting aside the discourse of the tongue in words of general signification, the 
ideas of our minds are the same with those of other living creatures, created from 
visible, audible, and other sensible objects to the eyes and other organs of sense, 
as their’s [sic.] are. For as the objects of sense are all individual, that is, singular, 
so are all the fancies proceeding from their operations; and men reason not but 
in words of universal signification, uttered or tacitly thought on.16
Note, once again, that except for the later intervention of language con-
cerning the isolated case of human beings, the principle of formation of sin-
gular thoughts and images is the same for all animals – namely, their “conatus” 
or “endeavour” –, which principle, as we have seen, is also at the basis of their 
will and behaviour. So, we are led back to our first question: what is the ben-
efit provided to men by the faculty of reasoning? And in which sense are men 
said to be different from all other sentient creatures, due to their capability of 
speaking and, hence, of reasoning?
Considered exclusively from an individual standpoint – leaving thus apart, 
as far as this paper is concerned, the otherwise extremely important aspect 
15. See Jianhong Chen, “On Thomas Hobbes’s Concept of Wonder,” in Michael F. Deckard 
and Péter Losonczi (eds.), Philosophy Begins in Wonder: An Introduction to Early Modern 
Philosophy, Theology and Science, Eugene OR, Wipf and Stock, 2011, p. 133: “According to 
Hobbes, all intellectual phenomena derive their existence from sense, the origin of the thoughts 
of man, and sense is caused or stirred by the pressure of the external body upon the organs of 
sense. In consequence of that pressure, there arises within the human body a resistance or 
counter-pressure. Hobbes uses the word ‘endeavor’ to describe this kind of ‘small beginnings of 
motion’ within the body of men. This inner endeavor expresses itself outward as the original 
fancy in different organs of sense: light to the eyes, sound to the ear, odor to the nostrils, savor 
to the tongue, and other qualities to the other parts of the body. After the object has been 
removed, the retained image or the decaying sense is what Hobbes calls imagination.”
16. EW V, p. 197.
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related to the possibility of communicating and sharing their thoughts –, 
language allows men to recall and compare things that are not presently given 
to their senses, which is something impossible to all other creatures capable 
of perceptions, but devoid of language. Otherwise stated, by the use of words, 
which signify the concepts of the mind independently from a thing’s being 
actually perceived by the organs of sense, men are provided with the possibil-
ity to detach their thoughts and images of the world from the material order 
of their sensible perceptions of the world itself, so to be able to reassemble their 
thoughts independently and compute things abstractly, or – as Hobbes says 
– in terms of “universal signification.” Furthermore, by giving men the pos-
sibility to name things which do not actually exist, language makes fictions 
and hypotheses possible. That is, language allows human beings to forecast 
future effects and imagine antecedent causes of the things, of which causes 
and effects we might have had no previous experience. This possibility of 
attaining knowledge of nonexistent things is explicitly acknowledged by 
Hobbes as a result of our faculty of language. As Hobbes says:
Nor, indeed, is it at all necessary that every name should be the name of some-
thing. […] Also this word future is a name, but no future thing has yet any being, 
nor do we know whether that which we call future, shall ever have a being or no. 
Nevertheless, seeing we use in our mind to knit together things past with those 
that are present, the name future serves to signify such knitting together.17
It is to be noted that Hobbes does not completely deny the presence of a 
kind of basic causal way of thinking common to all animals, which is acquired 
by habit and memory and not by reason, and which is equivalent to common 
experience or to “prudence,” as Hobbes also calls it.18 All animals, in fact, are 
somehow able to “foresight” and to refer to future events, by keeping track of 
the sequence of the things that they experience.19 As Hobbes says, if I have 
already seen several times that one thing uses to follow another, the actual 
presence of the first can act as a “natural sign” of the other to me.20 However, 
in this case, the future consequence evoked in my mind by a present thing 
corresponds to nothing other than the persistence of my memory of past 
17. De Corpore, I, 2, 6 / EW I, p. 17.
18. See Leviathan, IV, 46 / EW III, p. 664: “That original knowledge called experience, in 
which consisteth prudence […] is not attained by reasoning, but found as well as in brute beasts, 
as in man; and is but a memory of successions of events in times past, wherein the omission of 
every little circumstance altering the effect, frustrateth the expectation of the most prudent: 
whereas nothing is produced by reasoning aright, but general, eternal, and immutable truth.”
19. See Leviathan, I, 3 / EW III, p. 15.
20. See De Corpore, I, 2, 2 / EW I, p. 14: “For example, a thick cloud is a sign of rain to 
follow, and rain a sign that a cloud has gone before, for this reason only, that we seldom see 
clouds without the consequence of rain, nor rain at any time but when a cloud has gone before.”
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things: it is in no way a scientific hypothesis, and it provides no certain or 
universal knowledge of things and of their real causal connections.21
To the contrary, words are “arbitrary signs”: their reference to particular 
objects is “arbitrarily imposed.”22 Words mean the things we think, that is to 
say, independently from any existing connection between those very things 
and the signs chosen to signify them in our mind.23 Thus, the order of our 
speech – that is, our faculty of language – is granted a sort of autonomy from 
the order of our sensible experience. This allows men to use words with the 
purpose to establish new connections between the things they already know, 
on the one hand, and to name other things of which they have had no previ-
ous experience, on the other hand.24
To provide an example, let us assume the actual presence of clouds as a 
possible natural sign of incoming rain. After having had many experiences of 
the same enchainment of events, an animal will become able to associate the 
presence of clouds with the possibility of an incoming storm; to be precise, 
based on its past experience, that animal will quite inevitably end up estab-
lishing that connection. However, a beast will never be able to ask itself 
whether the same clouds might also be inhabited by some strange divinities: 
a beast, in fact, lacks the linguistic instruments apt to establish such an inde-
pendent connection between different objects – that is, a connection between 
objects which is not immediately implied by the past sequence of its sensible 
experiences. Furthermore, as Hobbes adds, a beast lacks the very will to 
enquiry whether such a hypothetical connection between things, never 
directly experienced, might eventually correspond to truth. That is to say, 
therefore, that animals are different from humans not only on account to their 
21. See Leviathan, I, 3 / EW III, p. 16: “As prudence is a presumption of the future, con-
tracted from the experience of time past: so there is a presumption of things past taken from 
other things, not future, but past also.”
22. See De Corpore, I, 2, 4 / EW I, p. 16.
23. See De Corpore, I, 2, 2-3 / EW I, pp. 14-15: “Of signs, some are natural, […] other are 
arbitrary, namely those we make choice of at our own pleasure, as a bush hung up, signifies that 
wine is to be sold there; a stone set in the ground signifies the bound of a field; and words so 
and so connected, signify the cogitations and motions of our mind. […] Words so connected as 
that they become signs of our thoughts, are called speech, of which every part is a name.”
24. With regard to this important point, and to the difference that exists between the mere 
voice (the physical act of emitting and hearing sounds, which is common to both men and 
animal and which can constitute a form of natural sign for any animal) and the specific human 
speech (the autonomous development of which is based on the arbitrariness of the signification 
imposed to the words, or vocal signs, used), see Yves Zarka, “Aspects sémantiques, syntaxiques 
et pragmatiques de la théorie du langage chez Hobbes.” See also Leviathan, I, 2 / EW III, p. 11: 
“The imagination that is raised in man, or any other creature indued with the faculty of imag-
ining, by words, or other voluntary signs, is that we generally call understanding; and is common 
to man and beasts. For a dog by custom will understand the call, or the rating of his master; 
and so will many other beasts. That understanding which is peculiar to man, is the understand-
ing not only his will, but his conceptions and thoughts, be the sequel and contexture of the 
names of things into affirmations, negations, and other forms of speech.”
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lack of language and reason, but also on account to their lack of a specific 
passion and desire – namely, the passion of curiosity.
Curiosity, or the appetite for knowledge:  
A dialectic between reason and passion
The possibility of reassessing our knowledge of things by linguistic means, 
independently from the material order of our sensible perceptions, and of 
investigating in abstract and universal terms the order of possible causes and 
effects of things, is indeed our faculty of reason. This faculty, which we gain 
only through a correct use of the words, enhances our present knowledge of 
the world, and it is an invaluable asset insofar as it allows us to better predict 
future events, to orientate our desires accordingly, and to modify the world at 
our will. In this sense, our knowledge of the world in terms of universal causal 
laws becomes itself an object of desire and of human appetite. And the human 
appetite for knowledge is what Hobbes calls “curiosity.”25
Needless to say, Hobbes mentions this passion of curiosity along with the 
faculty of language, characterising both of them as specific traits of human 
nature. I quote from Hobbes’ Elements of Law:
As in the discerning of faculties, man leaveth all community with beasts at the 
faculty of imposing names; so also doth he surmount their nature at this passion 
of curiosity. For when a beast seeth anything new and strange to him, he consid-
ereth it so far only as to discern whether it be likely to serve his turn, or hurt him, 
and accordingly approacheth nearer to it, or fleeth from it: whereas man, who in 
most events remembereth in what manner they were caused and begun, looketh 
for the cause and beginning of everything that ariseth new unto him. And from 
this passion of admiration and curiosity, have arisen not only the invention of 
names, but also supposition of such causes of all things as they thought might 
produce them. And from this beginning is derived all philosophy.26
From this passage, we can see quite clearly, once again, the peculiar agree-
ment, typical of Hobbes, between reason and passion. Reason, represented by 
the faculty of imposing names to the things, complies with our passionate 
desire of knowing the causes and the effects of the things themselves – that 
is, it complies with our “passion of curiosity,” as Hobbes calls it.
In interpreting this passage, Gianni Paganini argues that curiosity would 
provide that specifically human “passionate thought” which is capable of 
regulating our “train of thoughts” or “mental discourse” towards an end – 
25. See Leviathan, I, 12 / EW III, p. 94: “It is peculiar to the nature of man, to be inquisitive 
into the causes of the events they see, some more, some less; but all men so much, as to be curi-
ous in the search of the causes of their own good and evil fortune.” See also Jianhong Chen, 
“On Thomas Hobbes’s Concept of Wonder,” pp. 133-135.
26. Elements of Law I, 9, 18 / EW IV, pp. 50-51.
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namely knowledge –, which end is in no way a sensual pleasure “arising from 
the sense of an object present,”27 as Hobbes says in the Leviathan, and which 
can only be attained by reason28 – that is, by the correct use of our language.29 
I agree with this reading. Other commentators, such as Jeffrey Barnouw and 
Kathryn Tabb, go way further, claiming that the presence in men of the pas-
sion of curiosity alone would be a sufficient cause for their inventing language 
out of the blue, as it were, as a mean to an end.30 They correctly refer to another 
passage in Hobbes’ Anti-White, where he says that men, unlike all other ani-
mals, invented marks and names out of their curiosity of knowing the hidden 
causes of things – which is a kind of desire that the other animals lack at all.31 
Yet, both Barnouw and Tabb fail to notice at least one fundamental point: that 
is, that curiosity, like all desires, is an intentional passion, which must refer to 
an object. Now, being the object of curiosity by definition something which is 
not present to our senses, it can be grasped only by linguistic means and 
through reason – namely, in the actual form of hypotheses or fictions.32 
Without language, that is to say, it would be absolutely impossible to be curi-
ous of anything, for it would be impossible to address the very object of our 
actual curiosity. Hence, that would be curiosity of nothing, and curiosity 
would not exist at all. Therefore, either Barnouw’s and Tabb’s interpretation 
is wrong, or else they have unwittingly unveiled a dramatic contradiction lying 
at the core of Hobbes’ philosophical system.
27. Leviathan, I, 6 / EW III, p. 42.
28. Gianni Paganini, “‘Passionate Thought’: reason and the passion of curiosity in Thomas 
Hobbes.”
29. See also the definition of curiosity provided in Leviathan, I, 6 / EW III, pp. 44-45: 
“Desire to know why, and how, curiosity; such as is in no living creature but man: so that man 
is distinguished, not only by his reason, but also by this singular passion from other animals; 
in whom the appetite of food, and other pleasures of sense, by predominance, take away the care 
of knowing causes; which is a lust of the mind, that by a perseverance of delight in the con-
tinual and indefatigable generation of knowledge, exceedeth the short vehemence of any carnal 
pleasure.”
30. See Jeffrey Barnouw, “La curiosité chez Hobbes,” Bulletin de la Société française de 
Philosophie, 32 (1988), pp. 41-69; Kathryn Tabb, “The Fate of Nebuchadnezzar: Curiosity and 
Human Nature in Hobbes,” Hobbes Studies, 27 (2014), pp. 13-34.
31. Anti-White XXX, § 15, fol. 345, in Jean Jacquot and Harold W. Jones (eds.), Thomas 
Hobbes: Critique du “De Mundo” de Thomas White, Paris, Vrin, 1973, p. 356.
32. I am grateful to Torin Doppelt for having drawn my attention to the following passage, 
concerning the interrogative form, in Leviathan, I, 6 / EW III, p. 50: “Of the desire to know, 
there is a peculiar expression, called interrogative; as, what is it, when shall it, how is it done, 
and why so?” See also De Corpore, I, 3, 1 / EW I, p. 29: “From the connexion or contexture of 
names arise divers kinds of speech, whereof some signify the desires and affections of men; such 
are, first, interrogations, which denote the desire of knowing: as, Who is a good man? In which 
speech there is one name expressed, and another desired and expected from him of whom we 
ask the same.”
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Conclusion: Naming the objects of our curiosity – The case of God
Now, in the Leviathan, which is posterior both to the Anti-White and to the 
Elements of Law, Hobbes writes that “The first author of speech was God him-
self, that instructed Adam how to name such creatures as he presented to his 
sight,” and that “This was sufficient to direct him to add more names, as the 
experience and use of the creatures should give him occasion; and to join them 
in such manner by degrees, as to make himself understood.”33 He also says 
that “the name of God is used, not to make us conceive him, for he is incom-
prehensible; and his greatness and power are unconceivable; but that we may 
honour him.”34 So, how do we get this notion of God, since he is incompre-
hensible and unconceivable? Of course, out of curiosity, by looking for the 
hidden cause of everything, on the one hand; and out of our use of language, 
by naming that hidden, unperceivable cause of the things, on the other hand.
Curiosity, or love of the knowledge of causes, draws a man from the consideration 
of the effect, to seek the cause; and again, the cause of that cause; till of necessity 
he must come to this thought at last, that there is some cause, whereof there is no 
former cause, but is eternal; which is it men call God. So that it is impossible to 
make any profound inquiry into natural causes, without being inclined thereby 
to believe there is one God eternal; though they cannot have any idea of him in 
their mind, answerable to his nature. For as a man that is born blind, hearing 
men talk of warming themselves by the fire, and being brought to warm himself 
by the same, may easily conceive, and assure himself, there is somewhat there, 
which men call fire, and is the cause of the heat he feels; but cannot imagine what 
it is like; nor have an idea of it in his mind, such as they have that see it: so also 
by the visible things in this world, and their admirable order, a man may conceive 
there is a cause of them, which men call God; and yet not have any idea, or image 
of him in his mind.35
Put in front of a burning fire, an animal would either flee or warm itself, 
according to its sensations, without however interrogating itself as to the real 
causes of its actual feelings. To the contrary, a blind man, who can only feel 
the effects of the fire, without however having any idea or image of the actual 
cause of the heat he is presently feeling, can use that word, “fire,” to address 
that unknown cause of its present sensations – of which he is naturally curi-
ous. The same is for the case of God: we do see in fact many different effects 
in the world, whose ultimate explanation, however, relies upon a cause of 
which we can have no idea, nor any image or sensible experience. By the name 
33. Leviathan, I, 4 / EW III, p. 18. See also De Corpore, I, 2, 4 / EW I, p. 16: “Though some 
names of living creatures and other things, which our first parents used, were taught by God 
himself; yet they were by him arbitrarily imposed.”
34. Leviathan, I, 3 / EW III, p. 17.
35. Leviathan, I, 11 / EW III, pp. 92-93.
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of “God,” therefore, we address that hidden ultimate cause, which is also the 
ultimate unperceivable object of our curiosity.
Thus, if we are to maintain that there is indeed an essential primitive dif-
ference between the nature of men and that of animals, it is not incoherent to 
assume the distinctive traits of humanity to be, so to say, simply “brute facts,” 
whose final explanation can only rely upon God, that is, the ultimate incom-
prehensible reason of everything existing as such. Both the faculty of language, 
then, and the passion of curiosity, precisely because they mark an otherwise 
unexplainable difference between human beings and all other sentient beings, 
can be assumed, and must be assumed, to be the existing effects of the impen-
etrable will of the creator of everything – should there be one.
Therefore – this is my thesis, and these are also the last lines of my paper –, 
I would not say that the passion of curiosity alone is sufficient to explain the 
raising of the faculty of language in human beings. Rather, I would say that 
curiosity and language work together, and the one cannot exist without the 
other. Language, as a rational faculty, makes curiosity possible, by providing 
curiosity those abstract objects to which curiosity itself applies. Vice-versa, 
curiosity, as a passion, makes language meaningful and reason effective, by 
providing language and reason their final scope and aim – thus emancipating 
human beings from the animal condition.
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sommair e
Cet article montre comment l’interaction spécifique et la dépendance réci-
proque entre langage et curiosité se trouvent à la base, chez Hobbes, de la 
dialectique plus générale entre raison et passion, et comment cette interaction 
et cette dépendance mutuelle fournissent le vrai trait distinctif des êtres 
humains et de leur comportement.
summary
This article shows how the specific interaction and mutual dependence between 
language and curiosity accounts for the more general dialectic between reason 
and passion in Hobbes’ philosophy, providing the distinguishing trait of human 
beings and their behaviour.
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